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Abstract
We outline the general construction of three-player games with incom-
plete information which fulfill the following conditions: (i) symmetry with
respect to the permutations of players; (ii) the existence of an upper bound
for total payoff resulting from Bell inequalities; (iii) the existence of both fair
and unfair Nash equilibria saturating this bound. Conditions (i)÷(iii) imply
that we are dealing with conflicting interest games. An explicit example of
such a game is given. A quantum counterpart of this game is considered. It
is obtained by keeping the same utilities but replacing classical advisor by a
quantum one. It is shown that the quantum game possesses only fair equi-
libria with strictly higher payoffs than in the classical case. This implies that
quantum nonlocality can be used to resolve the conflict between the players.
I Introduction
One of the most important features of quantum theory is the nonlocality - the
existence of correlations that cannot be explained in the framework of any local
realistic theory. In particular, the correlations admitted by the latter must satisfy
certain set of inequalities which can be violated on the quantum level [1].
Violation of Bell inequalities has been confirmed experimentally [2]. Nonlocality
inherent to quantum physics appears to be useful in practice, in particular for infor-
mation processing (see [3], [4], [5] and numerous other references). Bell inequalities
can be also discussed in the context of game theory. One can pose the question
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how the properties of the game are modified due to the existence of nonlocal cor-
relations between the players. The first attempts to construct the games based on
quantum mechanical correlations concerned those of complete information [6]÷[10].
It appeared that the quantum versions of classical games offer additional strategies
which allow to resolve dilemmas that occur in classical games (for example, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma). It has been also shown that quantum games can be realized
experimentally [11], [12].
On the other hand the conclusion that the advantages of quantum counterparts
of classical games with complete information result from the specific properties of
quantum correlations has been much debated and criticized [13], [14]. In order to
make the relation between quantum nonlocality and the advantages of quantum
strategies more transparent the quantum versions of games with incomplete infor-
mation [15] have been proposed [16]. In this way the connection has been established
between the Bell theorem and the Bayesian games. In order to understand it let us
note that, as it is nicely explained by Fine [17], [18] (see also [19], [20]), the violation
of Bell inequalities is directly related to the existence of noncommuting observables.
Now, the unknown elements of the game with incomplete information are repre-
sented by the concept of the player type. On the quantum level the player types
are, in turn, represented by different, in general noncommuting, observables. This
leads to the violation of Bell inequalities. If the payoff functions of the players are
related to Bell expressions, the players sharing nonlocal resources can outperform
the ones having access to classical resources only.
In the particular example proposed by Cheon and Iqbal [16], which is a mixture
of Battle of Sexes and Chicken games, the bound on classical payoffs is related to
Cereceda inequalities [21]. The ideas of Cheon and Iqbal were further developed in
the papers [22], [23], [24], [25]. Quite recently Brunner and Linden [26] considered
the more general situation where nonlocal resources provide an advantage over any
classical strategy because the bounds on some combinations of payoff functions
follow from Bell inequalities.
The examples of games presented in [26] are the games of common interest.
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Pappa et al. [27] gave an example of conflicting interest game where quantum
mechanics also offers an advantage over its classical counterpart. The game they
consider is a two-player one obtained as a combination of the Battle of Sexes and
CHSH games. It is symmetric with respect to the permutation of players although
this property is somewhat hidden due to the specific numbering of strategies and
types used by the authors. An important point is that, in the classical version of the
game, the total payoff (the sum of payoffs of both players) is bounded from above
due to the Bell inequality. This implies that it is a conflicting interest game provided
there exist unfair equilibria saturating the bound resulting from Bell inequality. On
the other hand, on the quantum level all equilibria are the fair ones because the
payoff functions become equal. Moreover, there exist fair quantum equilibria where
the parties have strictly higher payoffs than for any classical fair equilibrium.
Further examples of conflicting interest games where quantum mechanics offers
an advantage were given by Situ [28]. Moreover, by a slight modification of the
payoff functions proposed in [27] Roy et. al [29] gave the examples of games where
quantum strategies can outperform even the unfair classical equilibrium strategies.
Depending on the values of additional parameters entering the payoff functions their
games have only fair equilibria, both fair and unfair equilibria or only unfair ones.
In final instance, all physics behind any example of quantum game with in-
complete information is related to quantum nonlocality manifesting in violation of
some Bell inequalities. The advantages of quantum strategies are the consequence
of quantum entanglement built into the game.
In the multipartite case the structure of nonlocal correlations is richer and less
understood [30]. There exist different definitions of nonlocality which refine the
bipartite definition. Therefore, it is advantegous to consider the three- or multiparty
generalizations of quantum Bayesian games. One example of three-party (three-
player) game has been provided by Situ et al. [31]. It is based on Svetlichny
inequality [32] and allows to analyse the advantages of the game based on fully
quantum correlations over the one where the correlations can be reduced to the
mixtures of two-player ones related locally to the third player.
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In the present paper we consider the three-player counterpart of the game con-
sidered in Ref. [27]. In Sec. II we outline the general construction of the three-player
games with incomplete information possessing the upper bound for total payoff fol-
lowing from Bell inequalities and both fair and unfair equilibria saturating this
bound. As we have mentioned above such games are automatically conflicting in-
terest games. In Sec. III we provide an explicit example of such a game. As a next
step we consider in Sec. IV a quantum counterpart of our game, i.e. we keep the
utilities intact but replace the classical advisor by a quantum one. It appears that
the quantum game possesses only fair equilibria and the corresponding payoffs are
strictly higher than the classical ones. We show that the nonlocality inherent in
quantum mechanics plays the twofold role: it raises, due to violation of Bell in-
equalities, the payoffs corresponding to fair equilibria and excludes the unfair ones.
To conclude this section let us note that the game-theoretic language has much
wider range of applications and is a very convenient tool for describing the peculiar
properties of quantum correlations. It can be used, for example, to study the
entanglement in spin systems [33], [34] or decoherence phenomena [35], [36], [37].
II Three-player games
We define a three-player Bayesian game following the analogous discussion of two-
player case by Pappa et al. [27] (see also [26]). There are three players, Alice (A),
Bob (B) and Charlie (C); each player acquires a type xi, i ∈ {A,B,C}, xi ∈ {0, 1},
according to the probability distribution P (x) ≡ P (xA, xB, xC). They decide on
their actions yi, yi ∈ {0, 1}, according to a chosen strategy. The average payoff of
each player reads
Fi =
∑
(x,y)
P (x) p
(
y|x) ui (x, y) (1)
where p
(
y|x) ≡ p (yA, yB, yC|xA, xB, xC) is the probability the players choose actions
y ≡ (yA, yB, yC) given their types were x ≡ (xA, xB, xC); ui
(
x, y
)
are the utility
functions determining the gains of players depending on their types and actions.
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The properties of the game are determined by the form of utility functions and the
restrictions imposed on the probabilities p
(
y|x).
In order to set the question of fair and unfair equilibria in the proper framework
we consider the games symmetric with respect to the permutations of players. This
implies the relations (which hold up to a possible renumbering of types and/or
strategies)
uA (xA, xB, xC , yA, yB, yC) = uB (xB, xA, xC , yB, yA, yC)
uC (xA, xB, xC , yA, yB, yC) = uC (xB, xA, xC , yB, yA, yC)
(2)
together with the similar relations obtained by choosing the remaining two pairs of
players. As far as the probabilities p
(
y|x) are concerned we assume they obey the
no-signalling conditions [30]
∑
yC
p (yA, yB, yC |xA, xB, xC) =
∑
yC
p (yA, yB, yC |xA, xB, x′C) (3)
and similar conditions for the remaining two players. Apart from eq. (3) we have
the normalization conditions
∑
y
p
(
y|x) = 1 for all x. (4)
Given no-signalling condition we consider two types of probability distributions:
(i) the classical case: one assumes further constraints on p
(
y|x) in form of Bell
inequalities [38], [39], [30]. According to Fine [17], [18], [19], [20] this leads
to the hidden variables representation of the relevant probabilities (actually,
Fine’s theorem concerns two-parties case but we assume it holds for three-
parties as well):
p (yA, yB, yC|xA, xB, xC) =
∫
dλρ(λ)pA (yA|xA, λ)·pB (yB|xB, λ)·pC (yC|xC , λ)
(5)
λ being a set of hidden variables distributed with probability density ρ (λ).
Note that since there are only two possible actions per player it is sufficient to
consider only hidden variables providing three bits so that λ ≡ (λA, λB, λC),
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pA (yA|xA, λ) = pA (yA|xA, λA) etc.
In game-theoretic language one says that the players receive advice from a
classical source that is independent of the inputs x; ρ (λ) can be viewed as
characterizing an advisor. In particular, if the strategies of the players are
uniquely determined by their types and advices they received (deterministic
hidden variable model),
yA = cA (xA, λ) , etc. (6)
one finds
Fi =
∑
x
P (x)
∫
dλρ(λ)ui (xA, xB, xC , cA (xA, λ) , cB (xB, λ) , cC (xC , λ)) (7)
On the other hand if the players are insensitive to the advisor suggestions,
pA (yA|xA, λ) = pA (yA|xA), etc., the probability factorizes
p (yA, yB, yC |xA, xB, xC) = pA (yA|xA) pB (yB|xB) pC (yC |xC) (8)
(ii) the quantum case: quantum probabilities (a quantum source/advisor) are de-
fined by the choice of tripartite density matrix ρ (which characterizes an ad-
visor) and the choice of three pairs of observables Ax, Bx and Cx, x = 0, 1,
acting in twodimensional Hilbert spaces of individual players and admitting
the spectral decompositions
Ax = 1 ·A1x + (−1) · A0x, 1 = A1x + A0x, etc. (9)
with Ayx, etc., being the corresponding projectors. The resulting payoffs read
Fi =
∑
x,y
P (x) Tr
(
ρ
(
AyAxA ⊗ ByBxB ⊗ CyCxC
))
ui
(
x, y
)
. (10)
Note that the general form of our quantum variables reads
Ax = ~n
(A)
x · ~σ (11)
where ~σ are Pauli matrices while ~nA0,1- the unit vectors,
~n
(A)
x =
(
sin θAx cosϕ
A
x , sin θ
A
x sinϕ
A
x , cos θ
A
x
)
; similar formulae are valid for B and C.
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In principle, we could also consider superquantum no-signalling distributions
[40]; however, we shall not dwell on this question.
In what follows we assume that the distribution of the player types is uniform,
P (x) =
1
8
for all x = (xA, xB, xC) . (12)
In order to construct the examples of games with conflicting interests which possess
fair quantum equilibria with higher payoffs than those corresponding to classical
equilibria we start with the utility functions ui
(
x, y
)
, i ∈ {A,B,C}. We demand
they obey the symmetry conditions (2). Moreover, we assume that the sum of
payoffs FA + FB + FC is expressible in terms of the expression(s) entering the Bell
inequality(ies). The relevant Bell inequality reads [38], [39], [30]
|〈A0B1C1〉+ 〈A1B0C1〉+ 〈A1B1C0〉 − 〈A0B0C0〉| ≤ 2 (13)
where Ax, Bx and Cx acquire the values ±1. Rewritting the above inequality in
terms of relevant probabilities and comparying the resulting expression with FA +
FB+FC one finds the conditions on utility functions. However, there is an important
difference between two- and three-players cases. In the latter one the resulting
equations are more stringent and imply that the utility functions lead to a trivial
game. This can be cured as follows. Note that the properties of a game (i.e. the
structure of its Nash equilibria) are invariant under the transformations
ui
(
x, y
)→ αui (x, y)+ β (14)
with arbitrary α and β. Therefore, if the constraints on u′is are not invariant under
(14) their solutions must be so special that they lead to a trivial game.
However, note that we have eight Bell inequalities at our disposal. In fact, the
remaining ones are obtained from (13) by making the replacement 0 ↔ 1 for one,
two and three players. In particular, in the latter case we arrive at the inequality
|〈A1B0C0〉+ 〈A0B1C0〉+ 〈A0B0C1〉 − 〈A1B1C1〉| ≤ 2. (15)
By demanding that FA + FB + FC is expressible in terms of the linear combination
(actually, the difference) of expressions entering (13) and (15) one finds much more
7
reasonable conditions on utility functions (in particular, they are invariant under
the transformations (14)).
The symmetry conditions (2) and the one imposed on FA + FB + FC allow us
to express the utilities ui
(
x, y
)
in terms of a number of independent parameters.
As a next step we select some set of strategies as the candidates for nonfair classical
equilibria. Additionally, we demand that, for these equilibria, the sum FA+FB+FC
saturates the uper bound following from Bell inequalities. If this is the case we
can take for granted that, for any fair equilibrium, at least one player will gain
smaller payoff than for the unfair one. The resulting general conditions (derived with
the help of MATHEMATICA) are too complicated to present them here explicitly.
Instead, we give an example of a game sharing the properties discussed above.
III The example of three-player game
The utilities in our example are presented in Table 1.
The elements of the matrices entering the Table 1 are indexed by xA (rows) and
yA (columns). Some elements of the utility functions above are negative (loss instead
of gain) but this can be easily cured, if necessary, using the symmetry transforma-
tions (14). The resulting game may seem slightly complicated but the underlying
principles are very simple: (i) symmetry with respect to the permutations of play-
ers, (ii) expressibility of the total payoff FA + FB + FC in terms of Bell operators
and (iii) saturation of the bound for total payoff following from Bell inequalities.
The latter reads in our example
FA + FB + FC ≤ 9
4
. (16)
Actually, in order to obtain the utilities presented in Table 1, we have used still one
constraint to be discussed below.
The game defined by the utilities given in Table 1 possesses the correlated Nash
equilibria described in Table 2. The rows in first three columns present the values
of y’s for x = 0 and x = 1.
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Table 1: The utilities of players
uA
(
x, y
)
:
yC = 0 yC = 1
yB = 0 yB = 1 yB = 0 yB = 1
xC = 0 xB = 0

 2 0
2 1



 32 1
0 2



 32 1
0 2



 4 1
4 19
3


xB = 1

 0 −1
−1 1



 − 12 2
1 0



 1 −1
1
2
0



 −2 − 196
−1 − 1
2


xC = 1 xB = 0

 0 −1
−1 1



 1 −1
1
2
0



 − 12 2
1 0



 −2 − 196
−1 − 1
2


xB = 1

 2 2
0 −2



 1 1
2 1
2



 1 1
2 1
2



 0 4
−1 2
3


uB
(
x, y
)
:
yC = 0 yC = 1
yB = 0 yB = 1 yB = 0 yB = 1
xC = 0 xB = 0

 2 32
0 − 1
2



 0 1
−1 2



 32 4
1 −2



 1 1
−1 − 19
6


xB = 1

 2 0
−1 1



 1 2
1 0



 0 4
1
2
−1



 2 193
0 − 1
2


xC = 1 xB = 0

 0 1
2 1



 −1 −1
2 1



 − 12 −2
1 0



 2 − 196
1 4


xB = 1

 −1 12
0 2



 1 0
−2 1
2



 1 −1
2 −1



 0 − 12
1
2
2
3


uC
(
x, y
)
:
yC = 0 yC = 1
yB = 0 yB = 1 yB = 0 yB = 1
xC = 0 xB = 0

 2 32
0 − 1
2



 32 4
1 −2



 0 1
−1 2



 1 1
−1 − 19
6


xB = 1

 0 1
2 1



 − 12 −2
1 0



 −1 −1
2 1



 2 − 196
1 4


xC = 1 xB = 0

 2 0
−1 1



 0 4
1
2
−1



 1 2
1 0



 2 193
0 − 1
2


xB = 1

 −1 12
0 2



 1 −1
2 −1



 1 0
−2 1
2



 0 − 12
1
2
2
3


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Table 2: ”Pure” Nash equilibria
yA yB yC FA FB FC
(0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) 5
8
13
16
13
16
(0, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0) 13
16
5
8
13
16
(0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 1) 13
16
13
16
5
8
(1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) 11
8
7
16
7
16
(0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) 7
16
11
8
7
16
(0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0) 7
16
7
16
11
8
(0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1) 3
4
3
4
3
4
(1, 1) (0, 1) (1, 1) 3
4
3
4
3
4
(1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 1) 3
4
3
4
3
4
In order to show that the configurations presented in Table 2 provide the Nash
equilibria we note first that the relevant probabilities are of the form (5). Con-
sider, for example, the first row in Table 2. The probabilities corresponding to the
strategies entering it read
pA (yA|xA, λ) = δyA,xA
pB (yB|xB, λ) = δyB ,0
pC (yC |xC , λ) = δyC ,0.
(17)
Eqs. (17) define an equilibrium. To see this consider the Alice payoff. Eqs. (5)
and (17) yield
p
(
y|x) = δyB ,0δyC ,0
∫
dλρ (λ) pA (yA|xA, λ) ≡ pA (yA|xA) δyB ,0δyC ,0 (18)
and, consequently,
FA =
1
8
∑
(xA,yA)
pA (yA|xA)
∑
xB ,xC
uA (xA, xB, xC , yA, 0, 0) ≡
≡ 1
8
∑
xA,yA
pA (yA|xA)uA (xA, yA) .
(19)
FA should be maximized on the convex set
∑
yA
pA (yA|xA) = 1, xA = 0, 1; FA acquires
maximum on some of extremal points of this set. The same reasoning applies to
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Bob and Charlie. So it remains to check the equilibrium condition on 26 strategies
yi (xi), i ∈ {A,B,C}.
By inspecting the Table 2 we see that we have 3 groups, each containing 3
equilibria; each set is invariant under the permutation of players. Two sets represent
unfair equilibria; the remaining one contains fair ones. The game is a conflicting
interest one as it is clearly seen from Table 2: there is no common equilibrium
preferred by all players. In fact, even if some mixed (i.e. the one with some 0 <
p
(
y|x) < 1) fair equilibrium existed, the payoff of each player could not exceed 3
4
due to the bound on the total payoff following from Bell inequalities.
IV The quantum counterpart of three-player game
Let us now pass to the quantum case. The density matrix ρ entering eq. (10) is
chosen as
ρ = |Ψ〉 〈Ψ| (20)
where |Ψ〉 is the GHZ state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|111〉+ i |000〉) . (21)
The choice of ρ determines the properties of advisor while the players strategies are
described by the probabilities p
(
y|x) which, in turn, are determined by choosing
the unit vectors ~n
(A)
x , ~n
(B)
x and ~n
(C)
x ; one needs twelve angles to characterize them.
This makes the problem complicated. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to the special
case θAx = θ
B
x = θ
C
x =
pi
2
. Let us denote by (ϕ1, ϕ2), (ϕ3, ϕ4) and (ϕ5, ϕ6) the angles
characterizing the observables Ax, Bx and Cx, respectively. It is then not difficult
to find the relevant payoffs
F ≡ FA,B,C = 1
48
(26 + 3 sin (ϕ1 + ϕ3 + ϕ5) + 2 sin (ϕ2 + ϕ3 + ϕ5)+
+ 2 sin (ϕ1 + ϕ4 + ϕ5)− 3 sin (ϕ2 + ϕ4 + ϕ5) + 2 sin (ϕ1 + ϕ3 + ϕ6)+
−3 sin (ϕ2 + ϕ3 + ϕ6)− 3 sin (ϕ1 + ϕ4 + ϕ6)− 2 sin (ϕ2 + ϕ4 + ϕ6)) .
(22)
11
We have fixed the values of utility functions in such a way that all payoff functions
are equal; this is the additional condition we have mantioned before. Due to this
property all Nash equilibria must be fair.
F is invariant under the transformations
ϕ1 → ϕ1 + χ1, ϕ2 → ϕ2 + χ1, ϕ3 → ϕ3 + χ2, ϕ4 → ϕ4 + χ2
ϕ5 → ϕ5 + χ3, ϕ6 → ϕ6 + χ3
(23)
provided χ1 + χ2 + χ3 = 2nπ. This follows from the relation
ei
χ1
2
σ3 ⊗ eiχ22 σ3 ⊗ eiχ32 σ3 |GHZ〉 = (−1)n |GHZ〉 . (24)
Maximizing F one obtains the Nash equilibrium. Due to the symmetry (23) we
get two parameter family of equilibria. To fix one we put ϕ1 = ϕ3 = 0. Then the
remaining angles (obtained numerically) read ϕ2 = −pi2 , ϕ4 = −pi2 , ϕ5 = 2.1588,
ϕ6 = 0.5880 (up to the multiples of 2π). The corresponding gain of each player is
FA = FB = FC = 0.842 (25)
We conclude that the quantum version of the game possesses only fair equilibria and
the corresponding payoffs are higher than in any classical fair equilibrium which, due
to the inequality (16), cannot exceed 0,75. Let us note that our game is genuinely
a quantum one (in spite of the restriction θix =
pi
2
imposed) since the strategies
are represented by, in general, noncommuting observables. However, the result
obtained (the existence of only fair equilibria) might occur as a consequence of
artificial constraint imposed on the θ angles. To get some feeling what is going
on consider the general quantum game with no constraints on θ′s. Let us take into
account the unfair equilibrium corresponding to the first row of Table 2. It is defined
by the probabilities p
(
y|x) which cannot appear on quantum level. In fact, assume
we have six pairs of onedimensional projectors Ayx, B
y
x and C
y
x obeying
〈Ψ| (AyAxA ⊗ByBxB ⊗ CyCxC
) |Ψ〉 = δyA,xAδyB ,0δyC ,0. (26)
Summing over yA and yB yields
〈Ψ| (1⊗ 1⊗ CyCxC
) |Ψ〉 = δyC ,0. (27)
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Now, 1⊗ 1⊗ CyCxC is a projector so that
(
1⊗ 1⊗ CyCxC
) |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 (28)
which is impossible (|Ψ〉 ≡ |GHZ〉).
We conclude that not all classical strategies can be reproduced on quantum
level. In particular, this concerns strategies leading to unfair equilibria. One can
say that quantum entanglement plays here twofold role: it excludes at least some
(unfair) equilibria and raises the payoffs corresponding to fair equilibria.
Finally, let us note that our results concern the case of uniform distribution
of the player types (cf. eq. (12)). If this condition is relaxed new interesting
possibilities arise. In the nice recent paper [41] Auletta et al. presented some
examples of three-party GHZ games with nonuniform distributions of types; in
particular, they constructed a game with the following feature: no no-signalling
(superquantum) distribution can help to achieve a better fair equilibrium than that
achieved by a quantum strategy. However, it should be stressed that the assumption
concerning the nonuniform distribution of types is here crucial.
V Conclusions
We have outlined the construction of general three-player game with incomplete
information such that: (i) it is symmetric under the permutation of players, (ii) the
upper bound on the total payoff results from Bell inequalities, (iii) there exist both
fair and unfair Nasha equilibria saturating this bound. Such games are necessarily
conflicting interes ones. Although the general formulae are rather involved, the basic
assumptions and the algorithm for constructing the game are clearly described which
allows to produce easily numerous examples. One example is presented in detail.
Contrary to the case of two-player game [27], [28], [29] one has to combine at least
two Bell inequalities to obtain a nontrivial game.
A quantum counterpart of the game is obtained by keeping the same utility
functions but replacing the classical advisor by a quantum one. As it has been
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already shown by Pappa et al [27] the quantum strategies can outperform the clas-
sical ones due to the quantum phenomenon of entanglement which leads to the
violation of Bell inequalities. The description of entanglement in the three-partite
(and multi-partite) case is more complicated than in two-partite one (see, for exam-
ple, Ref. [30]). One can consider, for example, the three-partite correlations which
are the mixtures of quantum and classical ones [32] and construct a three-players
game based on Svetlichny inequalities [31]. It is desirable to construct also the
three-player games based on Bell inequalities. In such a case one has to use more
than one Bell inequality. Another important point which should be mentioned is
that in order to ensure the violation of Bell inequalities (which allows the quantum
strategies to outperform the classical ones) one has to choose a particular form of
quantum advisor. It appears that it can be chosen in such a way that the pay-
off functions of the players coincide. This happens to be the case in the example
considered in Ref. [27] as well as in the one described in the present paper. The
quantum game possesses then only fair equilibria.
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